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A Public International Law Approach to Safeguard Nationality for 
Surrogate Born Children  
Dr Bríd Ní Ghráinne* and Dr Aisling McMahon** 
 
1. Introduction 
International surrogacy agreements pose complex challenges for the states involved. These 
include the question of what should be the nationality of children born following international 
surrogacy agreements (hereafter?international surrogate children¶), which this article focuses 
upon. Take the example of a child born to a surrogate in state A, whose intended parent(s) are 
from state B - how is the nationality of such a child determined?1 As this article explains, this 
question is often tied to who states A and B recognise as the legal parent(s). However, 
questions of nationality of international surrogate children, are complicated by: (i) differences 
in domestic provisions governing the legal parenthood of children; (ii) the absence of any 
overarching international framework in terms of legal parenthood; and (iii) disparities 
between national states on the legality of surrogacy and in particular, the legality of 
commercial surrogacy. Moreover, complications are exacerbated where more than two states 
are involved; for instance if the intended parent(s) are nationals of state C but reside in state D 
and propose to return and raise the child in state D; or where a donor egg and/or donor sperm 
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 Commissioning parent(s) refers to the person(s) who have asked the surrogate to carry a child for them, with 
the intention that the child will be handed over after birth to their care and will be raised by the commissioning 
parent(s).  
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from a national of another state is used in the creation of an embryo which is then implanted 
in the surrogate. The second scenario can pose difficulties in states where nationality or legal 
parenthood is tied to biological links as this means that the child may have no biological link 
with the intended  parent(s), and instead have a biological link with a third party national.  
Furthermore, given that many rights and responsibilities flow from the state to its nationals 
and this entails an economic burden for the state, states are often reluctant to recognise 
international surrogate children as their nationals. As a consequence, international surrogate 
children can be rendered stateless, that is persons?who [are] not considered as a national by 
any state under the operation of its law.¶2 The stateless person has been referred to as 
µflotsam, a res nullius,¶ and has been compared to µa vessel on the open sea, not sailing under 
any flag.¶3 This is because nationality entitles individuals to the diplomatic protection of a 
state and since many civil, political, and social rights (eg. the right to vote, and the rights to 
education, medical care etc. DUHGLUHFWO\ OLQNHG WRRQH¶VQDWLRQDOLW\, children born stateless 
are denied such protections and fundamental rights.4. Being born stateless creates significant 
problems immediately from birth, such as the inability to receive a passport, and imposing a 
continued status of statelessness on anyone, especially a child, is entirely unsatisfactory. It 
amounts to a failure in fundamental rights protection for such children, as their human rights 
often cannot be vindicated because their rights are not opposable to any particular state. 
Furthermore, nationality has been conceived of as part of one¶V identity which falls under 
RQH¶V right to a private and family life,5 which is also flouted in such cases.  
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This article illustrates the relatively untapped potential of Public International Law to 
determine which state, if any, has the obligation to grant nationality to international surrogate 
children who would otherwise be stateless. This examination contributes to the existing 
debate on international surrogacy agreements and statelessness by taking two novel 
approaches. First, this article examines international surrogacy agreements through a 
deliberately pragmatic perspective taking as its starting point the reality that international 
surrogacy agreements are occurring globally and increasing in rate, and that regardless of the 
ethical issues surrounding such agreements, all children have the right to a nationality. 
Consequently, an examination of the ethical questions which surround the existence and 
operation of international surrogacy arrangements is beyond the scope of this article, aside 
from a brief reference to put this discussion in context. Second, this article represents the first 
legal analysis of nationality and international surrogacy agreements through a Public 
International Law lens. Much of the literature surrounding international surrogacy agreements 
has focused on the Private International issues which for the reasons outlined in part 5, is not 
necessarily the best or indeed the only way to provide protection to international surrogate 
children. We encourage persons petitioning on behalf of stateless children to advance the 
arguments rooted in Public International Law contained in this article, as such arguments tend 
not to be made at present.  
This article also contributes to debates surrounding transnational/international reproductive 
services. Surrogacy represents a useful case-study for exploring the challenges relating to the 
governance of transnational UHSURGXFWLYH µWRXULVP¶ ZKHUH LQGLYLGXDOV WU\LQJ WR HYDGH
restrictions in their state of origin - or high costs - travel to states with more permissive 
regulatory frameworks. The desirability of surrogacy arrangements is contested. The main 
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objections include claims that it leads to exploitation;6 that free consent is impossible to 
obtain;7 and that it involves the commodification of children.8 On the contrary, others argue 
that surrogacy empowers women to support themselves; and/or that it supports the 
recognition/creation of differing family forms particularly same-sex or single parent families.9 
Accordingly, a fragmented patchwork of differing national regulatory responses is evident. 
Moreover, states with laws restricting surrogacy are often reluctant to recognise international 
agreements.10 More generally, many states only recognise legal parentage, subject to specific 
conditions, eg. only for heterosexual married intended parents; or if there is a biological 
connection between the intended parent(s) and child, leading to µIUDJPHQWDWLRQRISDUHQWDJH
into genetic, gestational, and LQWHQWLRQDOFRPSRQHQWV¶.11 We argue that the human rights of the 
child must prevail and must be prioritised over national public policy concerns seeking to 
prohibit/limit surrogacy. More broadly, this research contributes to the debates concerning 
areas where the law has difficulty accommodating rapid developments in technology.12 In 
SDUWLFXODU WKLVDUWLFOH¶VSXUSRVLYHDSSURDFK WR WUHDW\ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQFRXOGE\DQDORJ\ LQIRUP
interpretations of the law pertaining to cyberwarfare, disease control, outer space, and the use 
of drones.   
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Part 2 of this article commences by outlining the scope of the problem. It provides an 
overview of the current context of international surrogacy agreements, how statelessness 
occurs and how domestic courts have dealt with such issues. In light of the problems 
identified with being born stateless as discussed in part 3, part 4 of this article argues that, 
although there are some legal provisions that regulate this area ± such as the 1961 Convention 
on the Reduction of Statelessness and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights ± protection gaps nonetheless remain. The proposed Surrogacy Convention by the 
Hague Conference on International Law seeks to address these gaps. However, the drafters of 
this Convention are likely to encounter significant difficulties, with the result that it is likely 
to take years if not decades to finalise this Convention and it is unlikely to be ratified by those 
states that prohibit surrogacy arrangements. As a result, we argue that the ratification and 
implementation in domestic law of existing Public International Law conventions providing 
protection for stateless children should be given priority, as this approach offers the most 
meaningful solution for such children in the short term. Moreover, these existing protections 
should be used to inform any future protections for surrogate children against statelessness 
under the proposed Convention. 
 
2. International Surrogacy Agreements: The Current Landscape  
Surrogacy involves a scenario where a woman (the surrogate) agrees to become pregnant and 
carry a child for another couple or individual, the intended parent(s) with the intention that 
after birth this child is given to the intended parent(s) to raise. This is achieved either by 
artificial insemination - traditional surrogacy - where the surrogate is inseminated with 
donor/intended SDUHQW¶V VSHUP DQG VKH KDV D ELRORJLFDO OLQN ZLWK WKH FKLOG RU JHVWDWLRQDO
surrogacy where IVF is used to implant an embryo created using the intended parent(s) 
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gametes/and/or donor gametes in the surrogacy who will not have a biological link with the 
child. This highlights the differences in genetic links amongst the surrogate/intended parent(s) 
and the child, which may arise in the context of surrogacy agreements. This biological 
relationship may be relevant in the context of a discussion of statelessness, as some states 
factor this into the consideration of legal parenthood and/or nationality.  
There is no international legal framework applicable to surrogacy, and the national regulatory 
responses also differ. Generally states will fall into one of the following four broad categories: 
(i) the practice is unregulated, which means that it operates in a legal vacuum; (ii) states adopt 
a permissive approach where surrogacy is legal but unenforceable, and distinctions may be 
drawn between the legality of commercial and altruistic surrogacy;13 (iii) states adopt a 
permissive approach where contracts are enforceable (again, a distinction may be drawn 
between commercial and altruistic surrogacy); (iv) all forms of surrogacy are prohibited. 
These differing approaches are relevant in the context of nationality questions, as 
statelessness may arise for international surrogate children for two main reasons: (i) due to 
conflict of laws relating to questions of nationality and parenthood, where different 
approaches apply in the state where the child is born and the state of which the intended 
parent(s) is/are (a) national/s of, or to which s/he/they wish(es) to return, leading to 
difficulties in establishing the nationality of the child; and (ii) if international surrogacy 
agreements are illegal in the intended parent(s) state, that state may be reluctant to recognise 
the legal effects of surrogacy carried out abroad - and thus the link between the intended 
parent(s) and the child ± and therefore it is difficult to establish nationality.14 
Notwithstanding the dearth of international guidance on this area, the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law µ+&&+¶has recognised that international surrogacy agreements 
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 In some jurisdictions altruistic surrogacy is legal but commercial surrogacy prohibited. 
14
 See generally, Hague Conference on Private International Law, PermanenW %XUHDX µ3ULYDWH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
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(2011) available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2011pd11e.pdf   
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are growing at a rapid pace.15 Whilst the HCCH acknowledged the difficulties surrounding 
accurate reporting of international surrogacy agreements,16 it highlighted there was evidence 
from a study by Aberdeen University of a µWUHPHQGRXV JURZWK LQ WKH ³PDUNHW´? with an 
increase of nearly 1,000% in the number of documented arrangements when it examined data 
from five agencies specialising in international surrogacy from 2006-2010.17  
International surrogacy is also an area which is global in reach, with intended 
couples/individuals travelling from all regions of the world. The range of states to which such 
couples/individuals travel for international surrogacy agreements is diverse, although the 
more popular regions for couples/individuals to travel to are North America, Eastern Europe, 
and Asia.18 Having said this, there have been recent changes to the laws in states, including 
Thailand and India19 - previously popular µGHVWLQDWLRQ¶ states for international surrogacy- 
which now ban foreigners availing of surrogacy services in these states. Instead of halting the 
practice of overseas surrogacy, such agreements may be driven underground,20 and should 
foreign intended parent(s) continue to obtain surrogacy services in India/Thailand ignoring 
these rules, this will create further difficulties in terms of nationality for any children born 
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 Hague Conference on Private International Law, A Preliminary Report on Issues arising from International 
Surrogacy (March 2012), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2012pd10en.pdf, para. 2 . It has also 
been recognised that surrogacy is increasing within the EU, see EU Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, A 
comparative study on the regime of surrogacy in EU Member States (2013) available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/474403/IPOL-JURI_ET(2013)474403_EN.pdf, 
para. 5.1. 
16
 Ibid, para 6. 
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 Ibid, para 6. 
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 More than two states may be involved, as noted, e.g. if donor gamete(s) from a third jurisdiction is used. Ibid, 
para 6. 
19
 See, Government of India Ministry for Home Affairs, Circular No 462 Foreign Nationals including  Overseas 
Citizens of India  (OCI) cardholders] seeking to visit India for commissioning surrogacy (3rd November, 2015) 
which directed that India Missions/Posts/FRROs/FROs to ensure no visas would be issued to foreign nationals or 
permissions granted to OCIs to commission surrogacy in India. It also directed that no exit permission be given 
to children born through surrogacy in India to foreign nationals including OCI cardholders. However, the cases 
of children born through surrogacy already commissioned before the circular was issued exit permission would 
be decided on a case by case basis by FRROs/FROs.. This information is the based on the position at the time of 
writing 21st June, 2016. 
Nepal introduced a similar ban on surrogacy which included a ban for foreign nationals or arrangements initiated 
outside Nepal, on 18th September 2015, see http://nepal.usembassy.gov/service/surrogacy-in-nepal.html  
20
 It has been argued that a global ban on commercial surrogacy would likely result in a black market for 
surrogacy which could increase the potential for exploitation. See K Trimmings and P Beaumont, International 
Surrogacy Arrangements: Legal Regulation at the International Level (Hart Publishing, 2013), 442. 
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who would be unable to leave the jurisdiction. These developments are most likely to result in 
overseas couples going to other more liberal or less regulated jurisdictions for surrogacy 
services. Indeed, it has been reported, that since these changes, surrogacy has been increasing 
in Cambodia.21 In effect, the problems for nationality/statelessness in international surrogacy 
agreements are merely moved, becoming issues involving different jurisdictions than before. 
 
3. International Surrogacy Agreements and the Potential for Statelessness  
Two principles are crucial in terms of determining the nationality of a child at birth, namely:  
jus soli; and jus sanguinis. Under jus soli or µthe right of the soil¶, children acquire the 
nationality of the territory in which they are born. Some states may also adopt limited or 
conditional jus soli provisions, for instance based on a residency period.22 On the other hand, 
jus sanguinis, meaning µright of the blood¶, is where nationality is not determined by birth but 
by having parents or ancestors who are nationals of that state. If the state where the child is 
born operates under an absolute jus soli principle the child will be a national of that state once 
born, and so will not be stateless. However, if the state where the child is born operates a jus 
sanguinis approach WKHQWKHFKLOG¶Vnationality is precarious, and will be dependent on who is 
UHFRJQLVHGDVDµSDUHQW¶. Problems arise if the state of the intended parents, state B, operates 
under jus sanguinis but differs in its rules in terms of how parentage is decided by state A.23 
For instance, if a child is born in state A which recognises the intended parents, who are from 
state B, as the legal parents, state A will consider that the child should be a national of state B. 
However, if state B views the surrogate and her husband as the legal parents, it will consider 
the child a national of sWDWH$$VQHLWKHUVWDWH¶VODZFDQEHLPSRVHGRQWKHRWKHUthe result is 
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 0LFKDHO&RRNµ6XUURJDF\%XLVQHVVVKLIWVWR&DPERGLD¶Bioedge (7th November, 2015); Vandy Muong and 
:LOO-DFNVRQµ7KUHH0LOOLRQ'ROODU%DELHV¶3KQRP3HQK3RVWnd January, 2016). 
22
 6HH&KDUOHQH%HFNHUµ-XV6ROL$PLUDFXORXVVROXWLRQWRSUHYHQWVWDWHOHVVQHVV"¶th April, 2015) available at  
http://www.statelessness.eu/blog/jus-soli-miraculous-solution-prevent-statelessness  
23
 Glenn L. Cohen, Patients with Passports, Medical Tourism, Law and Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2014), 
403. 
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that a child born through surrogacy in state A could be left stranded in state A with uncertain 
legal parentage,24 and without nationality of either jurisdiction i.e. stateless. Difficulties may 
also arise if the state in which the child is born operates a conditional jus soli framework 
including residency requirements which a newborn child by definition would not meet. 
The difficulties which arise because of conflicting legal frameworks for parenthood are 
illustrated by the 2008 case of Re: X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy) before the High Court of 
England and Wales.25 This involved British intended parents who entered into an international 
surrogacy agreement with a married Ukrainian woman. The surrogate was implanted with an 
embryo created using donor eggs and the intended IDWKHU¶VVSHUPDQG gave birth to twins. The 
agreement remained amicable however, in the UK, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act (HFEA) provides that the surrogate is always considered the legal mother of the child.26 
Moreover as the Ukrainian surrogate was married, under the HFEA her husband, having 
known and consented to the treatment was presumed to be the legal father of the child.27 This 
is despite the fact that the intended IDWKHUZDVWKHFKLOGUHQ¶VELRORJLFDOIDWKHU28 However, in 
the Ukraine, the intended parents were seen as WKH FKLOGUHQ¶V OHJDO SDUHQWV. As Hedley J. 
QRWHGµthe children had no rights of residence in or nationality of the Ukraine and there was 
no obligation owed them by the state other than to accommodate them as an act of basic 
humanity in a state oUSKDQDJH¶.29 ,QVWHDG WKH FKLOGUHQ ZHUH µmarooned stateless and 
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 Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), Private International Law Issues surrounding the 
Status of children, including issues arising from international surrogacy arrangements (March, 2011), 9 
Available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2011pd11e.pdf  
25
 [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam). 
26
 Section 33 HFEA 2008, For discussion, see UK Visas and Immigration, Surrogacy, (June, 2010) available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/258243/surrogacy.pdf. For the 
definition of parent for nationality purposes, see British Nationality (Proof of Paternity) Regulations 2006; See 
generally, UK Border Agency, Inter-country surrogacy and Immigration Rules, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/261435/Intercountry-surrogacy-
leaflet.pdf , para 34. 
27
 S. 28 HFEA, 1990; s. 38  HFEA 2008. 
28
 [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam), para 5-6. 
29
 Ibid, para 8. 
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parentless whilst the applicants could neither remain in the Ukraine nor bring the children 
KRPH¶30  
Nonetheless, a temporary solution was found. Following the submission of DNA evidence 
proving that the intended father was the biological parent of the children, discretionary leave 
was provided for the children to enter the UK 7KLV ZDV DLPHG DW DOORZLQJ WKH FKLOGUHQ¶V
status to be regularised by applying for a parental order which would make the intended 
parents their legal parents,31 as a result of which they could then seek UK nationality for the 
children under the British Nationality Act 1981.32 The parental order which was the subject of 
these proceedings was subsequently granted.  
The case of Baby Manji involved an Indian surrogate and Japanese intended parents. An 
embryo was created using the intended IDWKHU¶VVSHUPDQGDQDQRQ\PRXVGRQRU¶VHJJZKLFK
was implanted in the surrogate resulting in the birth of a baby girl. However, the intended 
parents? relationship broke down and the intended mother refused to participate in the 
surrogacy agreement.33 When the child was born, the intended father sought to bring the child 
to Japan, but his application for a Japanese passport for the child  was unsuccessful as under 
Japanese law nationality was determined on the basis of the nationality of the birth mother i.e. 
here, the surrogate who was Indian.34 His application for adoption was also unsuccessful, as 
Indian law at the time prohibited the adoption of a female child by a single man. He then 
applied for an Indian passport for the baby. In order to obtain this, a birth certificate was 
required, and whilst under Indian law the intended father could be named on the certificate, it 
                                                          
30
 Ibid, para 10 
31S. 54 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. This allows for the transfer of legal parentage in cases of 
surrogacy subject to a number of conditions in the UK context, and avoids couples having to apply to adopt a 
child which was happening previously.  
32
 S. 1(5) British Nationality Act 1981. Since 2010,  if a parental order is granted a surrogate child automatically 
becomes a British national, but this would not have been automatic at the time of the case. 
33
 Katarina Trimmings and Paul Beaumont, International Surrogacy Arrangements: Legal Regulation at the 
International Level (Hart Publishing, 2013), 508. 
34
 &KDUOHV.LQGUHJDQDQG'DQLHOOH:KLWHµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO)HUWLOLW\7RXULVP7KH3RWHQWLDOIRU6WDWHOHVVFKLOGUHQLQ
cross-border commercial surrogacy aUUDQJHPHQWV¶Suffolk Transnational Law Review 527-626, 548. 
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was unclear who the legal mother was, namely, whether it was the surrogate or the intended 
mother, who did not wish to be part of the arrangement. Therefore, the birth certificate was 
refused.  
Eventually, the Indian passport office issued an identity certificate, a legal document issued to 
those who cannot get a passport in their discretionary solution, valid only for the baby to 
travel to Japan. Subsequently, the child was issued with a Japanese visa on humanitarian 
grounds, on which again no reference was mDGHWRWKHFKLOG¶VQDWLRQDOLW\ Once the child was 
in Japan, the Japanese authorities agreed that the baby could become a Japanese citizen 
subject to proof of the parent-child relationship.  
As can be seen, the diplomatic and/or discretionary µVROXWLRQV¶ adopted to resolve these cases 
are fraught with uncertainties for intended parents and surrogate-born children. They are also 
often ad hoc in nature, can take considerable time to arrange, can be expensive, and can 
require the intended parents to stay for a considerable period of time in state A with the 
child(ren). Moreover, these are often temporary solutions provided to allow the child to travel 
to state B with the intended parents, but (most importantly for the purposes of this article) 
they do not necessarily resolve the nationality status of the child, which may involve further 
processes after the child is in state B. TKHVHµVROXWLRQV¶DUH also of little practical benefit to 
children abandoned by intended parents following an international surrogacy agreement who 
are left in a highly precarious position under this current framework, as in many cases the 
temporary solutions described must be petitioned for through the legal system in either/both 
states. Without the intended parent(s) involved, it is questionable who will apply for such 
rights on behalf of the surrogate child. Moreover, even if the child has a surrogate willing to 
petition on his/her behalf, the reality is the surrogate may not have the resources or means to 
12 
 
access the legal services necessary to do so.35 Furthermore, as it is WKH FKLOG¶V nationality 
which is in issue in such cases, there is no recognisable state which will step in for their 
protection.  
For these reasons, we argue that the current framework surrounding the nationality of 
surrogate children does not sufficiently safeguard children against statelessness. Recourse to 
Public International Law is warranted as, although it has its limitations, it nonetheless goes 
some way to safeguard human rights for such children.  
 
4. International Protection of Stateless Children born under International Surrogacy 
Agreements 
The literature on International Surrogacy Agreements has taken a Private International Law 
approach,36 which implies complete state sovereignty over nationality. The key argument we 
are making is that existing provisions of Public International Law offer protection to children 
born stateless as a result of international surrogacy agreements. In becoming parties to 
particular treaties, states have consented to be bound to certain provisions that limit their 
powers in determining nationality. In the words of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights:  
?The classic doctrinal position, which viewed nationality as an attribute granted 
by the state to its subjects, has gradually evolved to the point that nationality is 
                                                          
35
 There will be exceptions to this, such as the case of Baby Gammy whose Thai surrogate decided to raise him 
after the commissioning parents refused to. Subsequently, she successfully petitioned - amidst much 
international media coverage - on behalf of the child for Australian citizenship See, Baby Gammy Granted 
Australian Citizenship, (BBC News, 20th January 2015) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-30892258.   
36
 <DVPLQH(UJDVµ%DELHVZLWKRXW%RUGHUV+XPDQ5LJKWV+XPDQ'LJQLW\DQGWKH5HJXODWLRQRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO
&RPPHUFLDO6XUURJDF\¶(PRU\,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ5HYLHZ.DWDULQD7ULPPLQJVDQG3DXO
Beaumountµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO6XUURJDF\$UUDQJHPHQWV$QXUJHQWQHHGIRU/HJDO5HJXODWLRQDWWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Level¶-RXUQDORI3ULYDWH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ.DWDULQD7ULPPLQJVDQG3DXO%HDXPRXQWHGVInternational 
Surrogacy Agreements: Legal Regulation at the International Level (Hart Publishing, 2013) 
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today perceived as involving the jurisdiction of the state as well as human rights 
issues.¶37  
The default position in international law is that it is the sovereign right of every state to 
determine under its own laws who are its nationals.38 Thus children born as a result of 
international surrogacy agreements do not have a de facto right of nationality vis a vis the 
state in which they were born. This position is a result of the traditional reluctance of the 
international community to find practical solutions to the problem of statelessness. However, 
since World War I there have been developments in the prevention of statelessness and in the 
protection of stateless persons. These developments are not specific to the context of 
international surrogacy agreements as surrogacy as a practice was not in existence until 
relatively recently.  
The first international instrument referring to the problem of statelessness was the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).39 $UWLFOHSURFODLPVWKDWµ>H@YHU\RQHKDV
WKHULJKW WRDQDWLRQDOLW\¶DQG WKDW µ>Q@RRQHVKDOOEHDUELWUDULO\GHSULYHGRIKLVQDWLRQDOLW\¶
However, this Article does not identify which state is obliged to grant nationality, nor under 
what circumstances nationality should be granted. More importantly, the UDHR, as a General 
Assembly resolution, is not ipso facto legally binding. Thus Article 15, while an indication of 
political will in this respect, does little in practical terms to combat the problem of 
statelessness.40  
                                                          
37
 Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion 
OC-4/84, January 19, 1984, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984), [32]-[35]. 
38
 Nottebohm Case (second phase), Judgment of April 6th, 1955, I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 4. See also the 1930 
Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law 179 LNTS 89; Article 1 
SURYLGHVWKDWµLWLVIRUHDFKVWDWHWRGHWHUPLQHXQGHULWVRZQODZVZKR are its nationals. This shall be recognised 
by other states in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles 
RILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZJHQHUDOO\UHFRJQLVHGZLWKUHJDUGWRQDWLRQDOLW\¶ 
39
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III). 
40
 See 3DXO :HLVV µ81 &RQYHQWLRQ RQ 6WDWHOHVVQHVV ¶   ,QWHUQDWLRQDO DQG Comparative Law 
Quarterly 1074, 1074 - 1075. An argument could be made that Article 15 is part of Customary International Law. 
For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has referred to article 15 of the UDHR as supporting its 
FRQFOXVLRQWKDWµ>t]he right of every human being to a nationality has been recognized as such by international 
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However, an attempt was made to find solutions to the problem of statelessness in 1961 when 
the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (CRS) was completed.41 Article 1 sets out 
the primary rule, which is that a Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person born 
in its territory who would otherwise be stateless. Article 1(a) and (b) sets out that such 
QDWLRQDOLW\ VKDOO EH JUDQWHG µD $W birth, by operation of law, or; (b) Upon an application 
being lodged with the appropriate authority, by or on behalf of the person concerned, in the 
PDQQHU SUHVFULEHG E\ WKH QDWLRQDO ODZ¶ This provision seems quite straightforward in the 
context of the problem identified ± a child born as a result of an international surrogacy 
agreement in a Contracting State is entitled to the nationality of that state, if s/he would 
otherwise be stateless (that is, if s/he does not receive nationality on the basis of the jus soli or 
jus sanguinis principles as outlined above).  
Nonetheless, the provision suffers from significant procedural hurdles. Article 1 may be 
subject to the condition that  the child has been habitually resident in the Contracting State for 
such period as may be fixed by that state, not exceeding five years immediately preceding the 
lodging of the application nor ten years in total.42 Unless a state adopts a zero days residency 
period, a child who has just been born will not fulfil residency requirements where such 
requirements are applicable, and thus not be entitled to nationality of the state in which he or 
she was born. For those FKLOGUHQ$UWLFOHSURYLGHVDµsafety net¶in the sense that he or she 
would be entitled to the nationality of one of his parents, provided one of his parents was from 
a Contracting State. This, once again, may be subject to a residency period of up to three 
years preceding the lodging of the application for nationality. However, a further significant 
problem that may arise is where the parent(s) of the child do not lodge an application for 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ODZ¶6HHProposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica , Advisory 
Opinion OC-4/84, January 19, 1984, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984), [33]. 
41
 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 989 UNTS 175. 
42
 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 989 UNTS 175, Article 2(b). 
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nationality.43 This could happen where the parent(s) decide they no longer want to raise the 
child. In such a case, it is unclear whether the child would remain stateless and much would 
depend on who was to become the guardian of the child. 
Thus the general position under the CRS is that a child will be given the nationality of the 
state in which s/he was born unless the child does not fulfil residency requirements set out by 
that state (where applicable), in which case the child will be entitled to the nationality of one 
of his/her parents. The exhaustive nature of the list of possible requirements means that states 
cannot establish conditions for the grant of nationality additional to those stipulated in the 
CRS. However, problems remain. First, similar to the issues raised in the first half of this 
article (where it was noted that difficulties in terms of nationality often revolve around the 
definition of parentage for this purpose), WKH PHDQLQJ RI µSDUHQW¶ XQGHU WKH CRS is also 
unclear: does it mean the biological parent or birth mother? At the time of the &56¶ drafting 
in 1961 - before the advent of assisted reproductive technologies - the birth mother and 
biological parent were synonymous concepts,44 so it is unclear whether the CRS can 
accommodate children born by surrogacy. However, we argue that a modern-day 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHWHUPµSDUHQW¶FRXOGEHDSSOLHGLQOLQHZLWKWKHREMHFWDQGSXUSRVHRIWKH
treaty,45 which is to reduce statelessness,46 and the evolutionary approach to treaty 
interpretation, which provides that the meaning of a term in a treaty is capable of changing 
over time.47 
                                                          
43
 7KHPHDQLQJRIµSDUHQW¶LVGLVFXVVHGEHORZ 
44
 The first baby born via in vitro fertilisation was Louise Brown, born in 1978, see Adam Eley, µHow has IVF 
GHYHORSHG VLQFH WKH ILUVW ³WHVW-WXEH EDE\´¶? BBC News (23rd July, 2015) available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-33599353  
45
 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331, Article 31(1). 
46
 Preamble, 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 989 UNTS 175. The preamble forms part of the 
&RQYHQWLRQ¶VFRQWH[WLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK9LHQQD&RQYHQWLRQRQWKH/DZRI7UHDWLHV8176
Article 31(2). 
47
 Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights, Costa Rica v Nicaragua, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, 
p. 213 [64]. 
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The second, and arguably most significant, problem is that only states that have consented to 
be bound to the CRS are indeed bound by it. At the time of writing, the CRS has only 65 
States Parties of the 193 or so states in the world. Thus the above-mentioned legal framework 
set out by the CRS is not applicable in most states - including India, Cambodia, the USA, and 
Thailand, states in which a significant amount of children have been born as a result of 
international surrogacy agreements.48 This lacuna of non-participation is anticipated by the 
CRS in Article 4, which provides that a Contracting State will grant its nationality to a person 
born in the territory of a non-Contracting State, if the nationalit\RIRQHRIWKDWFKLOG¶VSDUHQWV
was of that Contracting State. Putting aside the definitional issues surrounding who is deemed 
a µSDUHQW¶ IXUWKHU TXHVWLRQV DUH UDLVHG E\ $UWLFOH  :KDW LI WKH FKLOG LV ERUQ LQ D QRQ-
Contracting State, and both of that chLOG¶Vintended parents are from a non-Contracting State? 
This is the most likely scenario, as the majority of states in the world are indeed non-
Contracting states.49 In such a scenario, the CRS would have no applicability whatsoever and 
the child would be rendered stateless. Thus the problem identified in the first half of this 
article is not necessarily solved by application of the CRS. 
Even if the CRS were applicable, problems still arise in terms of enforcement. Although 
individuals may enforce their rights under the CRS at a domestic level by virtue of the 
relevant legislation which incorporates the CRS rights into domestic law, there is little, if any, 
recourse on the international level for those who feel the CRS has not been applied correctly, 
or has not been applied at all. This is due to a general lack of standing of individuals in the 
international judicial system, and due to the fact that the CRS does not provide for an 
individual complaint mechanism. Generally speaking, states are often reluctant or unable to 
hold other states accountable for denial of nationality and the UN High Commissioner for 
                                                          
48
 Ukraine is party to the Convention as of 25 March 2013. It is unclear whether the amount of International 
Surrogate Children born in India and Thailand will reduce following the recent criminalisation of International 
Surrogacy Arrangements in these jurisdictions. 
49
 There does not seem to be significant state practice or opinio juris to the effect that Article 4 represents 
customary international law. Therefore Article 4 is only binding on States Parties to the CRS. 
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Refugees (UNHCR) - which has a mandate for the assistance of stateless persons since 1974 - 
does not have a mandate to declare the denial of nationality illegal.50 
In light of the abovementioned problems, it is necessary to determine whether there are other 
provisions of Public International Law that would protect international surrogate children who 
are born stateless. Article 24(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966) (ICCPR VWLSXODWHV D FKLOG¶V ULJKW WR EH UHJLVWHUHG DIWHU ELUWK DQG WR DFTXLUH D
nationality.51 The ICCPR has significantly more State Parties than the CRS - 168 at the time 
of writing - yet similar to Article 15 of the UDHR, Article 24 of the ICCPR does not identify 
which state is obliged to grant nationality, nor under what circumstances nationality should be 
granted. In addition, in General Comment 17, the Human Rights Committee stated that 
$UWLFOHµGRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\PDNHLWDQREOLJDWLRQIRU6WDWHVWRJLYHWKHLUQDWLRQDOLW\WR
HYHU\ FKLOG ERUQ LQ WKHLU WHUULWRU\¶52 Accordingly, the right in Article 24 is not to be 
considered a right of the individual, but was accorded by the state at its discretion.53 However, 
the Human Rights Committee has urged states to enforce Article 24(3) in a meaningful 
manner, for example, in its comments on Ecuador, Colombia, and Zimbabwe.54  
The Convention on the Rights of WKH&KLOGµ&5&¶LVWKHPRVWZLGHO\-ratified international 
treaty.55 The CRC deals with the rights of children generally and not stateless children 
specifically, but six provisions (Art. 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 and 10) within the CRC are nonetheless 
                                                          
50
 UNGA Res 3274 [XXIX] [10 December 1974]; UNGA Res 31/36 [30 November 1976]. 
51
 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171. 
5252
 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No. 17: Rights of the Child (At 24): 
>@'XULQJWKHFRXUVHRIGUDIWLQJWKHRULJLQDOSURSRVDORI$UWLFOHSURYLGHGWKDWµ7KHFKLOGVKDOO
EHHQWLWOHGIURPKLVELUWKWR«DQDWLRQDOLW\¶'XULQJWKHHQVXLQJGHEDWHWKHZRUGµDFTXLUH¶ZDVLQVHUWHGDQGWKH
ZRUGVµIURPKLVELUWK¶ZHUHGHOHWHG$FFRUGLQJWR'HWULFNWKHVHDPHQGPHQWVZHUHPDGHEHFDXVHWKHPDMRULW\
felt that a state could not assume an unqualified obligation to afford its nationality to every child born on its 
territory regardless of the circumstances. 
53
 Sharon Detrick, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff 
1999), 150.  
54
 (1998) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.92; (1997) UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 76; (1998) UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add. 89. 
55
 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3. The USA and Somalia are the only UN members 
that are not States Parties to the CRC. 
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relevant to stateless children born by international surrogacy agreements.56 The first, most 
important, aspect of the CRC is its applicability. Article 2 sets out that States Parties only 
have an obligation towards children within their jurisdiction.57 However, this does not mean 
that the CRC does not have extra-territorial application. The drafting history of the CRC 
UHYHDOVWKDWWKHRULJLQDOSURSRVDORI$UWLFOHUHIHUUHGWRµDOl children in their territories¶ and 
thus the replacement of this terminology strongly indicates that the CRC does not apply 
exclusively on a territorial basis.58 Many of the provisions in the CRC have international 
aspects, such as those dealing with custody and access (Article 10), adoption (Article 21), and 
refugees (Article 22).59 More generally, there is significant international jurisprudence 
indicating that a treaty can be applicable where a state acts extra-territorially.60  
$UWLFOHSURYLGHVWKDWLQDOODFWLRQVFRQFHUQLQJFKLOGUHQWKHµEHVWLQWHUHVWVRIWKHFKLOGVKDOO
be a primar\FRQVLGHUDWLRQ¶6XFKDFWLRQVZRXOGRIFRXUVHLQFOXGHDSSOLFDWLRQVRQEHKDOIRID
child for the granting of nationality. More specific to the problem identified by this article, 
Article 7 provides that: 
µ7KHFKLOGVKDOOEHUHJLVWHUHGLPPHGLDWHO\DIWHUbirth and shall have the right from 
birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to 
know and be cared for by his or her parents. 
States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with 
their national law and their obligations under the relevant international 
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 'RXJODV +RGJVRQ µ7KH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /HJDO 3URWHFWLRQ RI WKH &KLOG¶V 5LJKW WR D /HJDO ,GHQWLW\ DQG WKH
ProblHPRI6WDWHOHVVQHVV¶,QWHUQDWLRQDO-RXUQDORI/DZDQGWKH)DPLO\-DDS('RHNµ7KH&5&
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5HIXJHH6XUYH\4XDUWHUO\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 
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 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3, Article 2; Sharon Detrick, A Commentary on the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff 1999), 69. 
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 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1349, p. 3. 
59
 Detrick, 71. 
60
 See, for example, Al-Jedda v United Kingdom, application no. 27021/08, 7 July 2011; Hirsi Jamaa and Others 
v. Italy, application no. 27765/09, 23 February 2012. 
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instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be 
VWDWHOHVV¶ 
Read in conjunction with Article 2 (which provides that it is the state in whose jurisdiction the 
child is has the obligation to implement the CRC), the obligation in Article 7 is thus primarily 
addressed to the state in which the child is born. +RZHYHU DV WKH ULJKW LV µWR DFTXLUH¶ D
nationality, the same considerations regarding Article 24 of the ICCPR apply, that is, that 
there may be an element of state discretion involved in the bestowal of nationality. It is 
difficult to reconcile this with the words µshall HQVXUH¶ in the second part of Article 3, which 
entail an obligation of result.61 This means that the state in which the child is born must 
successfully implement the right to acquire a nationality. The CRC does not specifically say 
the nationality granted should be the nationality of that state specifically; however we argue 
that in line with the object and purpose of the treaty (which is to protect the rights of the 
child),62 and the principle of effectiveness,63 that the State Party in which the child is born has 
at the very least an obligation to grant nationality where the child would otherwise be 
rendered stateless.  
In addition, Article 8 of the CRC provides that the State Party has a continuing obligation to 
preserve the chLOG¶VLGHQWLW\ZKLFKLQFOXGHVWKHLUnationality, name, and family relations and 
Article 9 provides that as a general rule, a child shall not be separated from his or her parents 
against their will. Thus where a child is awaiting determination of nationality, it can be argued 
that the state has an obligation not to expel his or her parent(s). This is supported by Article 
10, which provides that applications by a child or his or her parents to enter or leave a State 
Party for the purpose of family reunification shall be dealt with in a positive, humane and 
expeditious manner; and Article 3, which provides that the best interests of the child are 
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 Detrick, 68-69. 
62
 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331, Article 31(1). 
63
 This principle provides that the objective of treaty interpretation is to advance the aims of that treaty. See 
Richard K. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford University Press 2008), 190. 
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paramount. Clearly, being accompanied by their intended parents in the best interests of a 
newborn child. However, similar to the CRSWKHWHUPµSDUHQW¶ is undefined by the CRC.  
Finally, it should be noted that Optional Protocol III to the CRC, which provides for an 
individual complaints mechanism,64 entered into force in April 2014.65 It currently has 26 
States Parties, although the Committee has yet to deliver its views on any complaint received.  
 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not explicitly refer to nationality 
rights.66 +RZHYHU$UWLFOHSURYLGHVWKDWµHYHU\RQHKDVWKHULJKWWRUHVSHFWIRUKLVSULYDWH
and IDPLO\OLIH¶. The relationship between this article and international surrogacy agreements 
was examined in the recent cases of Labassee v. France and Menneson v. France.67 Both 
cases concerned a husband and wife who conducted surrogacy arrangements in the USA 
using the gametes of the husband and an egg from the surrogate. The cases examined the 
refusal of the French authorities to legally recognise the family tie between a child, his 
biological father, and his intended mother; and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
decided that the proceedings should be considered simultaneously.68 In its judgment, the 
ECtHR said that a distinction was to be drawn between: LWKHDSSOLFDQWV¶ULJKWWRUHVSHFWIRU
their family life; and (ii) the right of the children to respect for their private life. Regarding 
point (i), the ECtHR decided that because the children were not prevented from living in 
France and because of the doctrine of margin of appreciation,69 a fair balance had been struck 
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 States can also submit a declaration pursuant to Article 12 that they recognise the competence of the 
Committee to receive inter-state complaints. 
65
 General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of a Child on a Communications 
Procedure, 19 December 2011. 
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 1955 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 213 UNTS 221. 
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 Mennesson v France, application no. 65192/11, 26 June 2014; Labassee v France, application no. 65941/11, 
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 7KHFKLOGLQTXHVWLRQZDVQRWVWDWHOHVVKRZHYHUWKHFRQFHSWRIDµIDPLO\OLQN¶PD\EHUHOHYDQWLQIXWXUHFDVHV
where such a link must be established for the purposes of granting nationality. 
69
 This refers to space for manoeuvre that the Strasbourg organs are willing to grant national authorities, in 
fulfilling their obligations under the ECtHR. 
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between the interests of the parents and those of the state. Regarding point (ii), the ECtHR 
said that although the ECHR does not grant a right to nationality, nationality is an element of 
DSHUVRQ¶VLGHQWLW\DQGLWKDVFRQVequences for the enjoyment of other rights, in particular for 
inheritance rights. The ECtHR accepted that France may wish to deter its nationals from 
going abroad to undertake surrogacy agreements, but the effects of non-recognition of the 
FKLOGUHQ¶V UHODWionship with a parent affects the children, whose right to private life was 
substantially affected. The ECtHR WKHUHIRUHKHOGLQERWKFDVHVWKDW)UDQFH¶VUHIXVDOWROHJDOO\
recognise both families constituted a violation of right to private life under Article 8 ECHR.  
To draw this decision back to the question posed in this article, it appears that the ECtHR was 
willing to interpret Article 8 of the Convention broadly to find an obligation to recognise a 
family link between the intended mother, biological father, and a child born outside a 
Contracting State by an international surrogacy agreement. In future cases, this decision may 
be relevant for establishing nationality, particularly given the reference in the case to 
nationality formiQJSDUWRIDSHUVRQ¶VLGHQWLW\. Indeed, there is some evidence of the influence 
of this reasoning in recent domestic cases relating to surrogacy especially in states which 
previously adopted a restrictive approach.70 The HCCH has stated that Mennesson and 
Labasse has had an impact, and argue that a trend can, albeit cautiously, be discerned in 
recent cases in favour of the broader recognition of legal parentage following international 
surrogacy agreements under certain conditions.71 However, a notable feature of Mennesson 
and Labasse was that these children were present on French territory, which triggered 
)UDQFH¶V REOLJDWLRQ LQ WKLV UHJDUG. Had the children concerned never entered France, the 
ECHR would not apply. This is because Article 1 ECHR provides that it will only apply to 
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persons within the jurisdiction of the States Parties,72 and it is only in exceptional 
circumstances that a decision of a state that has extra-territorial effects can be held as a 
violation of the ECHR.73 Thus in order for Article 8 ± and by extension, the above case-law ± 
to be applicable, the child concerned would need to be present in Council of Europe member 
state to rely on the ECHR.74 As aforementioned, one of the first problems a stateless child 
often faces is entering the state of his intended parents, thus it is unclear how much assistance 
this case will give in practical terms as ipso facto, children born by virtue of international 
surrogacy agreements are born outside of the state of nationality and/or residence of their 
intended parents. 
The decisions of Labassee and Mennesson were followed by the decision of Paradiso and 
Campanelli v Italy in 2015.75 In this case, Italy refused to transcribe the birth certificate of a 
child born to a surrogate in Russia. When it emerged that the intended father had no genetic 
link with the child (contrary to the information that the intended parents had provided the 
authorities), the applicants were charged with distorting the civil state, forging, and violating 
the law on adoption. The child was subsequently placed in care and the applicants were found 
to no longer have standing in the adoption proceedings. 
The ECtHR ruled that the applicants could not act on behalf of the child, who had a guardian 
since October 2011. However, the ECtHR held that the decision to separate the child from the 
intended SDUHQWVDPRXQWHG WRDYLRODWLRQRI WKHSDUHQWV¶ right to family life as protected by 
Article 8 of the ECHR, as the child had been with the couple for six months and thus there 
existed a de facto family environment. The focus of the case was therefore on the removal 
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 See, for example, Soering v United Kingdom, application no. 14038/88, 7 July 1989. 
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aspect, as the ECtHR found that the claim regarding the transcription was inadmissible on 
DFFRXQWRIWKHDSSOLFDQWV¶IDLOXUHto exhaust domestic remedies.  
This judgment is of significance for stateless children born from international surrogacy 
agreements for the following reasons. First, in recognising that a de facto family environment 
was created despite: (i) a surrogacy contract which would be illegal in Italy; (ii) false 
statements being made in respect of parentage; and (iii) no genetic link between the intended 
parents and the child; the ECtHR has significantly broadened the decisions in Labassee and 
Mennesson. In this sense, the ECtHR does not address questions of public policy (i.e. the 
desirability of surrogacy) or morality of the actions of the intended parents when determining 
whether a family relationship exists for the purposes of Article 8. The ECtHR focuses only on 
the child¶s/intended parents? rights to private and family life, concentrating on the de facto 
links between the intended parents and the child.  To apply this by analogy to stateless 
children born from international surrogacy agreements, it could be argued that this decision 
has made it easier for intended parents to show the necessary link to a stateless child for the 
purposes of applying for nationality. In the words of Judges Raimondi and Spano, in their 
Separate Opinion: 
µ>«@the position of the majority essentially denies the legitimate choice of states 
to not recognise the effects of surrogacy arrangements. If creating an illegal link 
ZLWK D FKLOG DEURDG LV VXIILFLHQW WR FUHDWH D µIDPLO\ OLIH¶ LW LV FOHDU WKDW WKH
freedom of states to not recognise the legal effects of surrogacy agreements, a 
freedom previously recognised in the jurisprudence of this Court, is reduced to 
QRWKLQJQHVV¶76 
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Secondly, it may be recalled that in Labassee and Mennesson, the Court was unwilling to find 
thDW WKH SDUHQWV¶ $UWLFOH  ULJKWV KDG EHHQ YLRODWHG By ILQGLQJ WKDW WKH SDUHQWV¶ $UWLFOH 
rights had been violated, the Paradiso decision has broadened the scope of Article 8 in 
relation to international surrogacy agreements. The result is that the ECtHR has taken a 
purposive approach to Article 8 which is in line with the approach put forward by this article. 
Put simply, although the banning surrogacy is a prerogative of the state, the human rights of 
the child and of the parents is a separate human rights issue that is protected by the ECHR. 
Finally, although the decision in Paradiso recalled that the ECHR needs to be interpreted in 
accordance with the principles of international law, it is regrettable that the discussion of 
international law principles was limited to a brief mention of the 1961 Hague Convention 
Eliminating the Requirement of Legalisation of Foreign Public Documents. Many of the 
conventions discussed in the previous section also contain provisions that are particularly 
relevant to the facts in Paradiso. By analogy, in future ECtHR cases involving statelessness 
the ECtHR should follow the logic of its position and take into account all the provisions 
discussed in this article in its interpretation of the ECHR. 
 
5. Is a New Convention the Best Solution? 
Most of the literature to date on international surrogacy agreements identify the problems that 
arise by virtue of these agreements and generally agrees with the position of the HCCH that a 
new convention regulating international surrogacy agreements is necessary.77 However, a new 
convention will simply not solve the problems outlined by this article. Intended parents 
usually participate in international surrogacy agreements because commercial surrogacy is 
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illegal in their own national jurisdiction. Therefore states that have banned commercial 
surrogacy would have to ratify such a convention in order for it to be successful, i.e. so that 
the state of the intended parents would be obliged to grant nationality to international 
surrogate children. We argue that that simply is not going to happen. Even if states are willing 
to participate in the convention, it could years for the convention to enter into force. This was 
the case for the 1990 Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families,78 which only entered into force twelve years after its initial 
adoption by the General Assembly,79 and has been ratified by only 49 states.  
Second, the negotiation of a new convention could take years, if not decades. Negotiation on 
the proposed convention has not yet begun, as the HCCH is still in the very early stages of 
preliminary research. Third, there is no guarantee that a convention will ever be completed. 
The discussion of statelessness and nationality in this article is but one of many controversial 
issues on which the drafters of the Convention will have to find agreement. As any new 
Convention would necessitate the drafting of a framework for legal parentage in the 
Convention, negotiating what this would entail would be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible. Moreover, the context of how international surrogacy agreements operate, and 
particularly, the reasons why surrogates participate in such agreements RFFXU LQ µKLJKO\
GLIIHUHQWLDWHG ORFDOLWLHV¶80 throughout the world where practices/motivations vary 
significantly. For instance, in India, ethnographic studies have demonstrated that many of 
those who act as egg donors and surrogates do so in order to relieve permanent or temporary 
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indebtedness,81 and this may differ significantly from motivations of surrogates in states such 
as the US. Moreover, significant differences and inequalities may exist in terms of intended 
parents and surrogates involved in international surrogacy agreements.82 Any attempt to 
achieve a global consensus on the regulation of surrogacy, such as in the form of an 
international convention ?must necessarily be informed by detailed ethnographic research 
that elucidates the complex lived experience of clinical labour in situ? 83  and would need to 
?attend to the question of how power relations within the neoliberal economy are shaped by 
longer histories of unevenness and geopolitical and social in equality¶.84  Finally, no matter 
how comprehensive the negotiation process is, there will inevitably be cases that will fall 
outside the parameters of the convention. For these reasons, we argue that a realistic approach 
should be taken as to when and if a convention will ever enter into force and it needs to be 
borne in mind that a convention will not prevent all instances of statelessness from surrogacy 
arising.  
In the meantime, it is equally, if not more important to focus on existing binding provisions 
that regulate the bestowal of nationality for children born stateless pursuant to international 
surrogacy agreements. This is because states cannot use provisions of its domestic laws as an 
excuse for failing to carry out its international treaty obligations.85 The CRC, which is the 
most widely-ratified international treaty, offers the most comprehensive protection in this 
UHVSHFWSDUWLFXODUO\ZKHQWKHSURYLVLRQVRQQDWLRQDOLW\DQGWKHSULQFLSOHRIWKHµEHVWLQWHUHVWV
RI WKH FKLOG¶ DUH UHDG LQ FRQMXQFWLRQ ZLWK each other. Moreover, increasing the number of 
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States Parties to the CRS will have a direct impact on reducing statelessness, as states usually 
undertake accession in addition to other measures aimed at reducing statelessness, such as 
reforming nationality laws, conducting surveys of stateless populations and creating 
statelessness determination procedures. In addition, encouraging accession can involve 
engagement with a wide range of stakeholders at the national level, including politicians, 
government officials, community organizations and civil society groups.86 Such engagement 
provides an ideal opportunity to lobby for change on behalf of children born stateless as a 
result of international surrogacy agreements. 
Moreover, it is notable that following the successful outcomes of Paradiso, Mennesson, and 
Labassee, a number of cases are pending before the ECtHR. This includes Laborie et autres c. 
France (concerning the refusal of the French authorities to transcribe Ukrainian birth 
certificates of children born through international surrogacy agreements);87 Foulon c. 
France,88 and Bouvet et autres c. France (both cases concerning the refusal of the French 
authorities to transcribe Indian birth certificates of children born through international 
surrogacy agreements.)89 Given the broad approach that the Court took in Paradiso, it is 
likely that the ECtHR will find a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR in the above cases. It 
remains to be seen whether the ECtHR will use the principles of Public International Law as 
highlighted in this article to inform its rulings. 
We also argue that lawyers should be encouraged to make Public International Law 
arguments in domestic cases, while being mindful of the limits of those arguments as outlined 
above. For states such as the Netherlands that have a monist legal system, international law is 
directly applicable in the domestic legal system and thus the arguments canvassed in this 
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article are similarly directly applicable in a domestic court.90 For states such as the United 
KingdoP WKDW RSHUDWH D GXDOLVW OHJDO V\VWHP WKH QDWLRQDO OHJLVODWXUH PXVW µWUDQVIRUP¶ WKH
international obligation into a rule of national law, and the national judge will then apply it as 
a rule of domestic law.91 However, a domestic judge should interpret that domestic rule in 
accordance with its original source as an international instrument. As was stated by Lord 
Hope of Craighead with reference to the 1951 Refugee Convention:92 
µThe point is commonly made in regard to the Convention that it is not right to 
construe its language with the same precision as one would if it had been an Act 
of Parliament. The Convention is an international instrument >«@ its choice of 
wording must be taken to have been the product of the inevitable process of 
negotiation and compromise >«@ And the general rule is that international treaties 
should, so far as possible, be construed uniformly by the national courts of all 
states. This point also suggests that the best guide to the meaning of the words 
used in the Convention is likely to be found by giving them a broad meaning in 
the light of the purposes which the Convention was designed to serve.¶93 
Finally, we agree with the argument put forward by Ergas that the drafting of any new 
convention should be informed by existing human rights obligations.94 The ECJ held that 
human rights law limits Member States¶GRPHVWLFFRQGXFWDQGWKHVFRSHRIWKHLULQWHUQDWLRQDO
agreements.95 Similarly, the ICJ has held that even where a particular lex specialis applies, its 
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provisions are to be interpreted in view of human rights law,96 and human rights norms 
continue to apply unless they have been specifically suspended.97 Indeed, as aforementioned, 
the obligation to take into account international law was explicitly stated in the ECtHR 
decision of Campenelli, which dealt with the issue of international surrogacy agreements. 
Thus, it would in fact be a breach of international law for a state to carry out obligations under 
a new convention that conflicted with its existing human rights obligations and therefore the 
proposed convention would need to be in conformity with its existing obligations. We 
advocate in particular for the inclusion of those set out in the CRC as most states in the world 
are a party to that Convention. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
As identified above, the numbers of international surrogacy agreements are on the increase 
globally. With no international legal framework and significant disparities amongst national 
laws, children born as a result of international surrogacy agreements are in a precarious 
position. In such circumstances, as seen above, states have generally sought to achieve a 
temporary resolution but these solutions are often ad hoc in nature and can take considerable 
time and money to arrange.   
It is simply not satisfactory, given the general agreement internationally on the need to end 
statelessness, that children, who are one of the most vulnerable groups in society, and whose 
human rights and dignity must therefore be given the utmost legal protection, are born under 
WKH VKDGRZ RI µVWDWHOHVVQHVV¶ ZLWK DOO WKH DWWHQGDQW ULVNV WKLV position entails. Although the 
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proposed Hague Convention on Surrogacy, if completed, will address such issues, it is likely 
that it will take considerable time to conclude and that states that ban commercial surrogacy 
will be reluctant to participate. A better solution to the problems faced by international 
surrogacy agreement children is found in the provisions governing statelessness in Public 
International Law.  These provisions ± particularly those contained in the CRC and the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR± offer protection to international surrogacy agreement children 
and such provisions should be relied upon to interpret domestic legal provisions in litigation 
relating to international surrogacy agreements. Finally, the drafting of any new convention 
should be informed by existing international law obligations; particularly those set out in the 
CRC, which is the most widely-ratified treaty in the world. 
